Power and accountability in the EU financial regulatory architecture : examining inter-agency relations, agency independence and accountability by CHIU, Iris H.
POWER AND ACCOUNTABILITY IN THE EU FINANCIAL 
REGULATORY ARCHITECTURE: EXAMINING INTER-AGENCY 
RELATIONS, AGENCY INDEPENDENCE AND ACCOUNTABILITY 
 
Iris H-Y Chiu* 
 
 
Institutional reforms carried out at the EU level in the aftermath of the global 
financial crisis were purposed towards preserving the stability and well-functioning 
of financial markets in the EU. The European System of Financial Supervision was 
first created, followed by the Single Supervisory Mechanism supported by the Single 
Resolution Mechanism. The proliferation of European level regulatory and 
supervisory authorities has recalibrated the exercise of public authority over 
financial markets, and significant power has shifted from national to European level 
agencies.  The creation of EU level agencies is supported by avenues of formal 
accountability in political, stakeholder and judicial accountability, resulting in some 
complex designs in power structures. The article argues that such complex designs 
may affect the autonomy and technocratic efficacy of institutions. However, there is 
potential in leveraging upon one aspect the complexity offers- inter-agency 
coordination, in order to promote learning for technocratic effectiveness as well as to 
cultivate a form of accountability that ameliorates the perception of excessive power. 
The paper will focus on the inter-relationships between the three European sectoral 
agencies, especially in the Joint Committee and Board of Appeal to illustrate the 
achievements of inter-agency coordination and accountability. The paper will go on 
to explore new challenges that arise with the introduction of the SSM and SRM into 
the EU financial regulatory architecture. The paper will argue that promoting 
inter-agency coordination in specific areas may have the potential to address some of 
these challenges. The broader notion of inter-agency accountability can also spawn 
future lines of discourse and research into improving the credibility and legitimacy of 
the exercise of power by EU level agencies. 
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I. INTRODUCTION 
 
Institutional reforms carried out at the EU level in the aftermath of the 
global financial crisis were purposed towards preserving the stability and 
well-functioning of financial markets in the EU, while not compromising 
on the integration of the internal market. 1  The European System of 
Financial Supervision (ESFS) was first created in 2010, followed by the 
Single Supervisory Mechanism2 (SSM) supported by the Single Resolution 
Mechanism (SRM) in 2014. The ESFS comprises of three agencies, the 
European Banking Authority (EBA), the European Securities and Markets 
Authority (ESMA), the European Insurance and Occupational Pensions 
Authority (EIOPA), a Joint Committee of the three authorities and the 
European Systemic Risk Board (ESRB), a dedicated outfit to monitoring 
systemic risk which is situated under the umbrella of the European Central 
Bank (ECB). The proliferation of European level regulatory and 
supervisory authorities has recalibrated the exercise of public authority 
over financial markets, and significant power has shifted from national to 
European level agencies.3 National legislators and agencies have largely 
become administrators of EU regulation although the UK has chosen to 
engage in gold-plating forms of divergence in some aspects.4 
  
The shift in financial regulatory power to the EU is not accepted without 
unease. Hence, the powers vested in the institutions comprising the ESFS 
and the accountability mechanisms have been subject to rather complex 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
* PhD, Reader in Laws, Faculty of Laws, University College London. The author 
thanks Professor Gudula Deipenbrock and Professor Mads Andenas for their 
invitation to present this paper at the Roundtable on Financial Markets Regulation, 
HTW Berlin, 5 December 2014.The author also thanks two anonymous reviewers at 
the European Journal of Legal Studies. All errors and omissions are mine. 
1  Jacques de Larosière and others, Report by the High Level Group on Financial 
Supervision in the EU (Brussels, 25 February 2009) 
http://ec.europa.eu/internal_market/finances/docs/de_larosiere_report_en.pdf. 
2 See the Council Regulation (EU) No 1024/2013 of 15 October 2013 conferring 
specific tasks on the European Central Bank concerning policies relating to the 
prudential supervision of credit institutions [2013] OJ L 287/63 (‘SSM Regulation’). 
3 Niamh Moloney, ‘EU Financial Market Regulation After the Global Financial 
Crisis: More Europe or More Risks?’ (2010) 47 Common Market Law Review 1317. 
4 See discussion in Mads Andenas and Iris H-Y Chiu, ‘Financial Stability and Legal 
Integration in Financial Regulation’ (2013) European Law Review 335. 
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designs. 5  The EU financial regulatory architecture features a complex 
design of multiple institutions with different responsibilities located in 
delicately negotiated power and accountability structures that have to be 
consistent with Treaty foundations and the Meroni doctrine. Complex 
design continues to be a feature in the institution of the Single Supervisory 
and Single Resolution Mechanisms.  
 
Complex design reflects the political compromises achieved in sketching 
the contours of power and accountability relating to the institutions in the 
ESFS, the SSM and SRM, but the question is whether technocratic 
effectiveness may be traded off against complex design. This article takes 
stock of the complexities in the institutional architecture for regulating 
financial services in the EU and argues there is a need to mediate the needs 
of technocratic effectiveness and respecting the rationales for the complex 
designs that have come about. This article argues that exploring the space 
for inter-agency learning and coordination provides a way for balancing 
both objectives. This article thus finds the silver lining in the complex 
designs and makes broad level suggestions to provide perspective. However, 
it is acknowledged that such a perspective is a starting point and more 
detailed work can emanate from this research, especially in empirical work, 
to fully realise the potential of the perspective suggested in this article.  
 
When the ESFS was first institutionalised in 2010, inter-agency 
coordination was arguably legislated to be part of the institutional 
architecture in order to achieve the technocratic effectiveness and 
efficiency of joined-up thinking without amounting to creating a 
centralised and monolithic financial regulation agency at the EU level. 
Such inter-agency coordination between the three European agencies is 
found in the Joint Committee, the Board of Appeal that reviews any 
complaint regarding a decision imposed by one of the agencies, and the 
agencies’ coordinated work in assisting the ESRB. The article notes that 
inter-agency coordination has flourished among the European agencies and 
critically explores the advantages of such coordination in terms of the 
development of the agencies’ identities, technocratic expertise and inter-
agency accountability.    
 
This article argues that inter-agency coordination and accountability have 
highlighted perhaps the unintended benefits of the sectoral institutional 
architecture for regulating financial services in the EU. This albeit 
complex architecture has provided opportunities for the EU level agencies 
to boost their effectiveness and technocratic leadership, and offers further 
research possibilities into inter-agency accountability and improving the 
legitimacy of EU agencies as part of the ‘administrative polity’. Inter-
agency accountability can give rise to the development of novel indicators 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
5 Pablo Iglesias-Rodriguez, The Accountability of Financial Regulators (Wolters Kluwer 
2014). 
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for accountability, and such accountability could also be made more 
transparent in order to engage the public in a more informed discourse on 
the credibility and legitimacy of the exercise of power by EU level agencies. 
Inter-agency accountability is also an under-explored area that should be 
studied to see if non-conventional mechanisms of accountability could 
improve perceptions of legitimacy in EU level institutions, and contribute 
towards determining the performance of EU level institutions. 
 
The inter-agency model in the ESFS offers useful insights for the 
subsequent stage of reform in financial regulatory architecture in the EU 
represented by the advent of the SSM and SRM. There are a number of 
unresolved issues in the power and accountability structures in the SSM 
and SRM architecture, and this article will argue that beneficial insights 
can be gained from the ESFS model to develop solutions for these 
concerns.  
 
Part II of the article discusses the institutional architecture of the ESFS 
and how its power structures and accountability mechanisms have 
successfully constrained power and provided for extensive multiple 
accountability channels for the new institutions. It however raises the 
concern that more institutional autonomy may be needed for institutional 
effectiveness on the part of the EU level agencies. Part III then discusses 
how inter-agency coordination and accountability provide channels for 
boosting agency autonomy and technocratic leadership. Part III also 
engages in a literature review of the concept of inter-agency accountability 
and its promising aspects. Part IV then turns to the SSM and SRM as the 
subsequent stage of institutional architectural reform in regulating EU 
financial services and offers some observations regarding concerns for the 
coherence and technocratic effectiveness of the new institutions. This Part 
argues that insights from the three agencies’ inter-agency coordination and 
accountability can contribute towards consolidating the coherence of 
responsibilities and the achievement of technocratic effectiveness in an 
appropriate structure of powers in the SSM and SRM designs. Part V 
concludes.  
 
II. THE INSTITUTIONAL ARCHITECTURE IN THE EUROPEAN 
SYSTEM FOR FINANCIAL SUPERVISION (ESFS) -­‐	  THE FIRST STAGE 
OF INSTITUTIONAL REFORM 
 
Since the late 1990s legal integration has been identified to be key to 
market integration in financial services, 6  and a stealthy form of 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
6  European Commission, ‘Financial Services Action Plan: Implementing the 
Framework for Financial Markets’ (Communication) COM (1999) 232; Alexandre 
Lamfalussy and others, ‘Final Report of the Committee of Wise Men on the 
Regulation of European Securities Markets’ (Brussels, 15 February 2001) 
http://ec.europa.eu/internal_market/securities/docs/lamfalussy/wisemen/final-report-
wise-men_en.pdf; Eilis Ferran, Building an EU Securities Market (CUP 2004). 
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institutionalisation at the EU level7 for regulating financial services has 
emerged alongside regulatory convergence. The global financial crisis of 
2008-9 provided an opportunity for the EU to review the state of financial 
regulation and reforms that may be needed to address the issues surfaced 
in the crisis. The European Commission established a high-level group of 
experts chaired by Jacques de Larosière to recommend a blueprint for 
financial supervision in the EU. The de Larosière report recommended 
extensive legal harmonisation and institutionalisation of a European 
System of Financial Supervision8  (ESFS) in order to meet the needs of 
financial stability and market integration.9 
 
The ESFS comprises three pan-European financial regulators (the EBA,10 
ESMA11 and EIOPA12), a Joint Committee of the European Supervisory 
Authorities and national regulators, and a pan-European macro-prudential 
supervisor (the ESRB 13 ) formed under the auspices of the European 
Central Bank.  
 
However, hot on the heels of the creation of the ESFS, the acute problems 
of weak European banks in the periphery linked to weak sovereigns was 
threatening to overcome the EU with another series of banking crises, in 
euro-area countries such as Portugal, Ireland, Greece, Spain, Cyprus and 
even non-euro-area countries such as Bulgaria. The second wave of 
institutionalisation has therefore taken place to install the European 
Central Bank as the single micro-prudential supervisor for key banks in the 
euro-area and banks in voluntarily participating countries outside of the 
euro area. This is for the purpose of severing the links between weak 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
7 Iris H-Y Chiu, Regulatory Convergence in EU Securities Regulation (Kluwer Law 
International 2008). 
8 See account and analysis by Eddy Wymeersch, 'Europe’s New Financial Regulatory 
Bodies' (2011) 11 Journal of Corporate Law Studies 443. 
9 Mads Andenas and Iris H-Y Chiu, ‘Financial Stability and Legal Integration in 
Financial Regulation’ (2013) European Law Review 335. 
10 European Parliament and Council Regulation (EU) 1093/2010 of 24 November 
2010 establishing a European Supervisory Authority (European Banking Authority), 
amending Decision No 716/2009/EC and repealing Commission Decision 
2009/78/EC [2010] OJ L331/12 (EBA Regulation 2010). 
11 European Parliament and Council Regulation (EU) 1095/2010 of 24 November 
2010 establishing a European Supervisory Authority (European Securities and 
Markets Authority), amending Decision No 716/2009/EC and repealing Commission 
Decision 2009/77/EC [2010] OJ L331/84 (ESMA Regulation 2010). 
12 European Parliament and Council Regulation (EU) 1094/2010 of 24 November 
2010 establishing a European Supervisory Authority (European Insurance and 
Occupational Pensions Authority), amending Decision No 716/2009/EC and 
repealing Commission Decision 2009/79/EC [2010] OJ L331/48 (EIOPA Regulation 
2010). 
13 European Parliament and Council Regulation (EU) 1092/2010 of 24 November 
2010 on European Union macro-prudential oversight of the financial system and 
establishing a European Systemic Risk Board [2010] OJ L331/1 (ESRB Regulation 
2010). 
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sovereigns and national banks, 14 so that confidence can be shored up 
against the relevant national banks that can be nursed and regulated back 
to health. The Single Supervisory Mechanism15 (SSM) is supported by the 
Single Resolution Mechanism (SRM) for the banks overseen in the SSM. 
The SRM has been developed alongside regulatory convergence in 
recovery and resolution frameworks for financial institutions.16 In sum, the 
regulatory architecture for financial services has undergone major overhaul 
since the onset of the global financial crisis 2008-9. The first stage of the 
overhaul (at that time not seen as a first stage) came in the form of the 
ESFS in 2010, and the second stage of the overhaul relating to the SSM in 
place from November 2014. In view of the borderless nature of financial 
services and markets and the significant pan-European effects of financial 
fallouts, 17  increased policy-making at the EU level is an inevitable 
development and the observed ‘transference of powers to the EU’ is a 
trajectory set to continue. Nevertheless, EU financial regulation is based 
on an ‘intervention-based’ model where much of day-to-day supervision is 
left to national regulators who are subject to European level purview.18 
Although institutional reform at the EU level for regulating financial 
services is the accepted policy direction, reforms are inevitably viewed with 
some fear and suspicion as regulating financial services is a matter of 
political salience19 and of interest to EU political institutions, Member 
State governments and national regulators, the industry and various 
stakeholder groups. For example, the British attack on ESMA’s power to 
adopt emergency measures under the EU Short-selling regulation20 partly 
reflects its interests in protecting the hedge fund industry which is sizeable 
in the UK financial services sector. Institutional reforms have thus been 
born out of much debate, controversy and compromises reflected in the 
designs relating to institutional power and accountability.  
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
14 “Eurozone Agrees Common Bank Supervisor”, Financial Times (13 Dec 2012). Kern 
Alexander, ‘Bank Resolution and Recovery in the EU: Enhancing Banking Union?’ 
(2013) 14 ERA Forum 81. 
15 SSM Regulation (n 3). 
16 Regulation (EU) No 806/2014 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 15 
July 2014 establishing uniform rules and a uniform procedure for the resolution of 
credit institutions and certain investment firms in the framework of a Single 
Resolution Mechanism and a Single Resolution Fund and amending Regulation (EU) 
No 1093/2010 [2014] OJ L 225/1 ('SRM Regulation').  
17  See discussion in Guido Ferranini and Luigi Chiarella, ‘Common Banking 
Supervision in the Eurozone: Strengths and Weaknesses’ (2013) at 
http://ssrn.com/abstract_id=2309897. 
18 Pierre Schammo, ‘EU Day-to-Day Supervision or Intervention-Based Supervision: 
Which Way Forward for the European System of Financial Supervision?’ (2012) 32 
OJLS 771. 
19  Christel Koop, ‘Explaining the Accountability of Independent Agencies: The 
Importance of Political Salience’ (2011) 31 Journal of Public Policy 209. 
20 Case 270/12 United Kingdom v Parliament and Council (not yet published) , supported 
in Jacques Pelkmans and Mara Simoncini, ‘Mellowing Meroni: How ESMA Can 
Help Build the Single Market’ CEPS Commentary, 18 February 2014. 
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1. An Outline of the Framework of the ESFS 
In the face of urgent need for reform in the immediate aftermath of the 
global financial crisis, the first stage of institutional reforms was based on 
formalising institutional structures that had already existed in a quasi-
independent form. These structures were the ‘Level Three’ Committees i.e. 
the Committee of European Banking Supervisors (CEBS), the Committee 
of European Securities Regulators (CESR) and the Committee of 
European Insurance and Occupational Pensions Supervisors (CEIOPS) 
formed pursuant to the Lamfalussy recommendations of 2001 to foster 
supervisory and regulatory convergence in the implementation of 
harmonised legal standards.21 Level Three committees forged technical 
guidelines to assist in the consistent implementation of harmonised legal 
standards and to achieve consistency in supervisory techniques and styles. 
The Committees’ technical guidelines were not binding, but the 
Committees’ work provided a soft framework for regulatory convergence 
on the books as well as in practice.22 Furthermore, the Committees23 
fostered comity and respect for peer pressure through mechanisms such as 
CESR’s consolidated ‘Questions and Answers’24 and informal mediation 
processes facilitated by CESR for national regulators. The formalisation of 
structures already in existence seemed less politically controversial (as the 
Committees have had an evolutionary history based on their inter-
governmental nature) and represented a reform step that was imminently 
achievable and efficient.  
 
The graduation of the three sectoral Level Three committees to 
independent agencies is a logical step to take in institutionalising EU 
financial regulation, although the sectoral approach to regulation has, 
especially in the US context, been criticised for its limitations, 
incompatibility with developments in the financial sector and perhaps 
incoherence. 25  The EBA, ESMA and EIOPA are tasked with certain 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
21 For example, see CESR, ‘Which supervisory tools for the EU securities markets?’ 
(25 October 2004) Preliminary Progress Report No 04-333f 
http://www.esma.europa.eu/system/files/04_333f.pdf accessed 18 December 2012 
(‘Himalaya Report’), 5. 
22 Iris H-Y Chiu, Regulatory Convergence in EU Securities Regulation (Kluwer Law 
International 2008), chs 2-5. 
23 Mark W Zacher and Brent A Simon, Governing Global Networks (CUP 1996), 13-35, 
for a general discussion of regime theory; James N Rosenau and Ernst Otto Czempiel 
(eds), Governance Without Government: Order and Change in World Politics (CUP 1992, 
rep 2000), 219; Anne-Marie Slaughter, A New World Order (Princeton University 
Press 2004). These discussions shed light on the nature and dynamics of cooperation 
in networks that exert powerful and consensual governance without requiring state-
based backing by sanctions. 
24 Majone has also argued that the platform for technical standards and developing 
technocracy finds less resistance to network cooperation and consensus. See 
Giandomenico Majone, Regulating Europe (Routledge 1996). 
25 See Jeremy W Markham, 'Super-Regulator: A Comparative Analysis of Securities 
and Derivatives Regulation in the US, UK and Japan' (2003) 28 Brooklyn Journal of 
International Law 319, E Wymeersch, The Structure of Financial Supervision in 
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overall responsibilities for EU financial regulation, but they oversee 
national regulators and are not directly involved with regulated entities, 
which are still subject to national regulators. The three agencies have the 
continuing mandate of market integration and legal convergence, and 
protective objectives, such as systemic stability and consumer protection. 
The Regulations establishing the EBA, ESMA and EIOPA have mirror 
provisions on the roles, functions and powers of these bodies.26 In terms of 
furthering the market integration objective, these bodies have the power 
to recommend technical standards for uniform implementation of EU 
Directives in financial regulation and to issue binding guidelines on 
supervisory practices and standards.27 
 
The three agencies are responsible for achieving market integration 
through supervisory convergence, based on common guidelines,28 and the 
monitoring of coherence in supervisory action. The three agencies, in 
forging supervisory convergence, have the power to facilitate the settling 
of disagreements between national regulators, or where conciliation fails, 
to impose a decision to resolve the disagreement. 29  They are also 
responsible for establishing colleges of supervisors for joint supervision and 
stress testing of financial institutions,30  forging a common supervisory 
culture 31  and conducting peer reviews of national regulators for 
convergence in supervisory measures.32 
 
The three agencies have the mandate to take the lead on setting policies 
and standards in consumer financial protection 33  and ensuring the 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
Europe: About Single, Twin Peaks and Multiple Financial Supervisors' at 
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=946695; but see Joseph J Norton, 
'Global Financial Sector Reform: The Single Financial Regulator Model Based on the 
United Kingdom FSA Experience--A Critical Reevaluation' (2005) 39 International 
Lawyer 15; Howell E Jackson, 'Regulation in a Multi-sectored Financial Services 
Industry' (1999) 77 Washington University Law Quarterly 319. 
26 See analysis in Niamh Moloney, ‘The European Securities and Markets Authority 
and Institutional Design for the EU Financial Market – A Tale of Two Competences: 
Parts 1 and 2’ (2011) 12 European Business Organisation Review 43 and 178 
respectively. 
27 EBA, ESMA and EIOPA Regulations, arts 8, 10, 15-16. However, the power to 
make such delegated legislation is revocable by the European Council and Parliament 
(see arts 12 and 13) and is subject to review by the Commission (art 11). The 
substantive technical standards may also be vetted and objected to by the 
Commission (art 14), providing layers of checks and balances to the exercise of such 
legislative power. The status of successfully passed standards and guidelines are 
however binding on Member States and non-compliance would amount to a breach 
of Union law (art 17). 
28 EBA, ESMA and EIOPA Regulations, art 16. 
29 EBA, ESMA and EIOPA Regulations, arts 18, 19. 
30 EBA, ESMA and EIOPA Regulations, art 21. 
31 EBA, ESMA and EIOPA Regulations, art 29. 
32 EBA, ESMA and EIOPA Regulations, art 30. 
33 EBA, ESMA and EIOPA Regulations, art 9. 
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consistent application of financial guarantee schemes. 34  They are also 
tasked to deal with systemic risk mitigation,35 provide support for the work 
of the ESRB and facilitate coordinated crisis management by national 
regulators. 
 
The sectoral approach is arguably insufficient for dealing with pan-
European perspectives and cross-border issues. Pan-European solutions to 
banks which have extensive cross-border operations proved to be 
challenging in the crisis as national governments and regulators engaged in 
self-interested actions, some to a greater degree than others.36 Hence, 
there is a need for the institution of a European level architecture that is 
able to engage with pan-European perspectives and develop capacity to 
deal with problems of that scale. In the absence of a single financial 
services regulator and/or supervisor for the EU, the creation of the ESFS 
includes a Joint Committee of the three sectoral agencies that could 
provide joined-up perspectives in the financial sector. Further the Joint 
Committee and the three agencies would support the work of the 
European Systemic Risk Board (ESRB). The ESRB is the pan-European 
body that is tasked with macro-prudential oversight. 37  It is a body with a 
governing Board 38  independent of the European Central Bank but 
nevertheless nested within the European Central Bank.  The ESRB has the 
power to collect and request information from the three European 
authorities mentioned above, from national central banks and from 
regulators39 in order to carry out its analytical responsibilities to determine 
whether systemic risk warnings should be sounded. The ESRB’s role is to 
issue warnings and/or recommendations to the EU as a whole or to 
individual Member States or national regulators40 but these warnings and 
recommendations are not strictly binding. A number of commentators41 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
34 EBA, ESMA and EIOPA Regulations, art 26. 
35 EBA, ESMA and EIOPA Regulations, arts 22, 23, 32. 
36 For example, the German and British unilateral actions in freezing Icelandic banks’ 
assets in their jurisdictions upon failure of those banks; the unilateral unlimited 
deposit guarantee offered by Ireland to save its banks, the national lines taken in the 
resolution of Fortis bank. Post-crisis pan-European solutions in the resolution of 
Dexia, Cyprus banks, Bankia and Banco Espirito Santo of Portugal have however 
been dovetailed into coordinated European resolutions. See Jean Pisani-Ferry and 
Andre´ Sapir, 'Banking Crisis Management in the EU: An Early Assessment' (2010) 
Economic Policy 341; Mark Rhinard, 'European Cooperation on Future Crises: 
Toward a Public Good' (2009) 26 Review of Policy Research 439; Joel P Trachtman, 
'The International Law of Financial Crisis: Spillovers, Subsidiarity, Fragmentation 
and Cooperation' (2010) Journal of International Economic Law 719. 
37 ESRB Regulation, art 3. 
38 ESRB Regulation, art 6. 
39 ESRB Regulation, art 15. 
40 ESRB Regulation, art 16. 
41 Eilis Ferran and Kern Alexander, ‘Can Soft Law Bodies Be Effective? Soft Systemic 
Risk Oversight Bodies And The Special Case Of The European Systemic Risk Board’ 
(2010) European Law Review 751; Alexandra Hennessy, ‘Redesigning Financial 
Supervision in the European Union’ (EUSA conference, Boston, 3-6 March 2011). 
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have noted that although the power of the ESRB is limited to such ‘soft 
law’ warnings, these measures are unlikely to be ignored. Indeed, they are 
likely to facilitate a form of economic governance that may be adapted to 
suit both boom and crisis times. 
 
It is noteworthy that institutional reform did not go along the lines of 
creating one centralised financial regulator and/or supervisor for EU 
financial markets.42 Wymeersch43 opines that the creation of one single 
financial services regulator and/or supervisor would have entailed difficult 
political discussions about the structure, governance and location of the 
single integrated body. In fact, the creation of such a body may require 
Treaty change as it is unlikely that such a body could be founded upon the 
narrow Meroni doctrine.44 The ESFS is arguably the subject of painstaking 
design to ensure adequate constraints of power within the confines of the 
Meroni doctrine and multiple accountability channels.45 These aims have 
arguably been achieved in the institutional architecture of the ESFS, but 
this Section raises the questions of whether institutional effectiveness and 
autonomy have been traded off. This Section argues that the power and 
accountability structures have succeeded in bounding the ESFS within 
certain constraints, but may pose handicaps to institutional effectiveness. 
 
2. Critically Exploring the Complex Designs in Power and Accountability in the 
ESFS and Technocratic Effectiveness of the Institutions 
In view of the pan-European powers and responsibilities vested in the 
three agencies, a complex design of power and accountability structures 
has come about to ensure that the three agencies fall within appropriate 
parameters of political constraints. Commentators are of mixed opinions 
whether the three agencies should be regarded as ‘powerful’ agencies. One 
school of opinion views the three agencies as limited and constrained in 
power as (a) the agencies do not have law-making power as such; they assist 
the Commission in providing first drafts of supporting technical standards 
to primary legislation; (b) they largely do not have direct relationships with 
regulated entities, except in the case of credit rating agencies and central 
counterparties under the purview of ESMA; (c) they rely on national 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
42 See M Andenas, 'Who is Going to Supervise Europe’s Financial Markets?' in M 
Andenas and Y Avgerinos (eds), Financial Markets in Europe - Towards a Single 
Regulator? (Kluwer Law International 2003) at xv. 
43  Eddy Wymeersch, ‘The Inst Itutional Reforms of the European Financial 
Supervisory System, An Interim Report’ (2010) at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1541968. 
44 Case 9/56 Meroni v High Authority [1957-58] ECR 133 which provides that EU 
institutions can only delegate well-defined executive powers but not broad 
discretionary powers. This has lasting implications for the creation of EU agencies, 
and the Commission’s White Paper on European Governance (2001) arguably 
reinforces the need for technocratic expert-led independent European agencies with 
specific powers to implement policies made by the Commission and take individual 
decisions pursuant to those policies but not to have broad regulatory powers. 
45 Herwig CH Hofmann, ‘Agency Design in the European Union’ (2011) at 
http://ssrn.com/abstract=1823231. 
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regulators to implement and enforce regulatory rules and in the collection 
of information;46 and (d) even in emergency situations where they wish to 
exercise the power to address a specific decision to a regulated entity, the 
approval of the European Council needs to be sought. Other 
commentators however view the three agencies as immensely powerful as 
they have quasi-regulatory powers distinguishing them from the other 
established types of agencies in the EU that are advisory in nature or 
implementers of policy without own discretion.47 In particular the three 
agencies are powerful as supranational supervisors of national regulators in 
terms of imposing implementing standards for regulation, supervisory 
convergence, settlement of disputes and mandating information 
conveyance. ESMA uniquely enjoys direct regulatory powers over credit 
rating agencies although specific powers and enforcement actions are set 
out in such a way as to meet the Meroni constraints against delegating 
broad discretionary powers.48  
 
The diverging perspectives on the three agencies’ powers possibly reflect a 
general uncertainty towards their position in the regulatory space. Such 
uncertainty has arguably arisen due to the complex arrangements over 
decision-making. The complexity is due to the need to keep within the 
Meroni parameters while effectively empowering the agencies to carry out 
tasks appropriate for their technocratic expertise. Thus, on the one hand, 
the agencies are regarded as ‘powerful’ in light of the loss of regulatory 
discretion on the part of national regulators in terms of policy and law-
making and supervisory practices. On the other hand, the agencies may not 
be regarded as ‘powerful’ because many of their key responsibilities are not 
undertaken independently, such as developing regulatory standards and 
addressing emergency decisions. Both perspectives of the agencies are valid 
if the agencies are looked at as bound up with the EU political institutions, 
particularly the Commission.49 The agencies could be viewed as extensions 
of ever-increasingly EU political power while not being autonomously 
powerful themselves.  
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
46 Elaine Fahey, ‘Does the Emperor Have Financial Crisis Clothes? Re£ections on 
the Legal Basis of the European Banking Authority’ (2011) 74 Modern Law Review 
581; Nicolette Kost de Sevres and Lorenzo Sasso, ‘The New European Financial 
Markets Legal Framework: A Real  Improvement? An Analysis of Financial Law and 
Governance in European Capital Markets from a Micro and Macro economic 
Perspective’ (2011) Capital Markets Law Journal 30. 
47 Pierre Schammo, ‘The European Securities and Markets Authority: Lifting the 
Veil on the Allocation of Powers’ (2011) 48 Common Market Law Review 1879; 
Michelle Everson, ‘A Technology of Expertise: EU Financial Services Agencies‘ (June 
2012) LSE Research Paper; Pablo Iglesias-Rodriguez, The Accountability of Financial 
Regulators (Wolters Kluwer 2014). 
48 Niamh Moloney, ‘Reform or Revolution? The Financial Crisis, EU Financial 
Markets Law, and the European Securities and Markets Authority’ (2011) 60 ICLQ 
521. 
49 Noted in DG for Internal Policies, Parliament’s Review of the ESFS (2013) as many 
stakeholders’ views. 
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The complexity in the design of power structures is due to a pre-
occupation with keeping within the Meroni parameters, and with ensuring 
that accountability mechanisms are constructed comprehensively in order 
to dispel fears and suspicions against the three new agencies. In this 
process, the independence of the agencies which is an important attribute 
towards effectiveness seems relatively neglected.50 The independence of 
these technocratic and expert-led agencies is a key attribute believed by 
the European Parliament51 to be important for sound financial regulation 
in the EU, un-entangled from political interests and regulatory capture.  In 
general, commentators support the independence of agencies as 
agencification is intended to achieve the purposes of de-politicisation and 
the forging of technocratic and objective solutions to regulatory issues.52 
The roles of the three agencies could indeed provide a mediating platform 
between political and national interests given their inter-governmental 
background, and yet forge an objective and expert-led position on the final 
shape of policy and regulation.53 This article notes Everson’s concerns54 for 
excessive de-politicisation of policy-making in financial regulation by 
framing these issues as subject to technocratic regulation, but is more 
optimistic about the three agencies’ roles. This article is of the view that 
the three agencies can act as suitable platforms to mediate the 
technocratic aspects of financial regulation and the more politically-
charged aspects. The UK and Germany’s responses to the Icelandic bank 
failures in 2009 for example, have demonstrated the precedence of 
politically-charged actions over technocratically efficient solutions. Hence, 
there may be a case for arguing the contrary to Everson’s concerns - that 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
50 Although the agencies are tasked to act independently, EBA, ESMA and EIOPA 
Regulations, art 1, and national regulator representatives, the Chairperson of the 
governing body, the Board of Supervisors and the Executive Director of the 
administrative organ, the Management Board, are tasked to exercise their judgment 
independently of political and national interests, arts 42, 46, 49 and 51, the 
Regulations feature overwhelmingly substantive provisions on control and 
accountability that may affect independence. 
51 DG for Internal Policies, Parliament’s Review of the ESFS (2013); Pablo Iglesias-
Rodriguez, The Accountability of Financial Regulators (Wolters Kluwer 2014), 217. 
52 Madalina Busuioc and Martijn Groenleer, ‘The Theory and Practice of EU Agency 
Autonomy and Accountability: Early Day Expectations, Today’s Realities and Future 
Perspectives’ in M Everson, C Monda and E Vos (eds), European Agencies in between 
Institutions and Member States (Kluwer Law International 2014 forthcoming); Damien 
Geradin, ‘The Development of European Regulatory Agencies: What the EU Should 
Learn from American Experience’ (2004) 11 Columbia Journal of European Law 1. 
53 One notes Everson’s critique of this position as technocratisation could be a way to 
evade addressing the political nature of some issues and hence mute the voices 
concerned with political implications, see Michelle Everson, ‘A Technology of 
Expertise:  EU Financial Services Agencies‘ (June 2012) LSE Research Paper. 
54 It is noted that Everson warns against de-politicisation of issues in the EU by 
technocratisation of these as regulatory areas. She is sceptical of the effectiveness of 
such an approach and the is concerned for the marginalisation of democratic voice in 
policy-making, see Michelle Everson, ‘A Technology of Expertise:  EU Financial 
Services Agencies ‘ (June 2012) LSE Research Paper. 
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there is a need to de-politicise policy-making in financial services 
regulation. 
 
The path towards achieving greater de-politicisation and technocratisation 
of financial regulation involves the recalibration of the political hold over 
financial regulation itself. The design of the three agencies’ power and 
accountability structures thus reflects this challenge, and has resulted in 
the institution of significant controls on the three agencies’ exercise of 
powers. The author of this article is of the view that policy-makers have 
become too pre-occupied with designing appropriate controls to the 
extent of insufficient consideration for the importance of the 
independence of the three agencies for the purposes of their technocratic 
effectiveness. This Section will argue that although the three agencies are 
subject to extensive channels of political and stakeholder accountability in 
their exercise of powers, designed to please the relevant constituents who 
are concerned with the powers vested in the agencies, these mechanisms 
could pose handicaps to supporting the development of technocratic and 
objective work on their part. Some of these mechanisms are more in the 
nature of ‘control’ mechanisms directly cutting down the level of autonomy 
the agencies could enjoy.  
 
In terms of control, certain EU political institutions have rights of control 
over the agencies’ decisions, such as Commission’s final say on draft 
technical standards55 and implementing technical standards56 submitted by 
the three agencies as part of their work in developing the single rulebook, 
the Council’s power to revoke a decision addressed by the three agencies 
to Member State regulators,57 the Council’s power to determine whether 
an emergency situation has arisen for the three agencies to take particular 
decisions addressed to specific financial institutions, 58  and the 
Commission’s oversight of the three agencies’ budgets 59  and staff 
employment policies.60 The Commission has the power to review the 
delegated power to the three agencies in drafting technical standards and 
may recommend extension of such delegation. The Council or Parliament 
may exercise the power to revoke such delegation.61 The power of EU 
political institutions to instruct the three agencies to undertake certain 
tasks is also a form of control over the agencies’ powers. For example, the 
Parliament, Council or Commission could ask the agencies for advisory 
opinions on any matter of their competence,62 the Commission could issue 
an opinion on a Member State’s breach of Union law and ask the agencies 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
55 EBA, ESMA and EIOPA Regulations, art 10. 
56 ibid, art 15. 
57 ibid, art 38. 
58 ibid, art 18. 
59 ibid, arts 63-65.  
60 ibid, art 68. 
61 ibid art 11, 12. 
62 ibid art 34. 
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to address decisions directly to financial institutions concerned,63 and the 
ESRB could ask the agencies for information to assist in its systemic risk 
oversight.64 
 
In terms of political accountability, the three agencies are subject to ex ante 
forms of accountability such as Commission representation on the 
governing body, the Board of Supervisors, albeit in non-voting capacity. 
The governing body is dominated by Member State regulators alongside 
non-voting representatives from the Commission, ECB, ESRB and the 
other ESAs.65 Furthermore, the European Parliament has the power to 
veto the appointment of the Chairperson of the Board of Supervisors,66 
and its approval is required for the appointment of the Executive 
Director67 of the Management Board, which is the administrative organ of 
the agencies supporting the work of the Board of Supervisors. 
 
The three agencies are also subject to extensive reporting accountability to 
the EU political institutions in respect of certain decisions. Although such 
reporting may be carried out after the decision is taken, it is unclear if such 
reporting is ex post for information only or whether intervention may 
indeed be carried out by the political institutions. For example, where the 
three agencies consider that there is a need to restrict or prohibit certain 
types of financial activity, such as short-selling to preserve the financial 
stability of the EU, the Commission needs to be informed in order ‘to 
facilitate the adoption of any such prohibition or restriction’.68 It is not 
clear if the Commission has the final say, but it would seem that the 
Commission’s acquiescence is a pre-condition to such a decision made by 
the agencies, and the legislative wording suggests Commission control 
rather than ex post accountability to the Commission. The three agencies 
also need to inform the Commission, Council and Parliament of the 
informal guidelines and recommendations they issue to Member State 
regulators, 69  report on market developments, risks, trends and 
vulnerabilities twice a year to the Commission, Parliament and Council,70 
submit annual work programmes71 and annual reports72 to the Commission, 
Parliament and Council. The Parliament or Council could also invite the 
Chairpersons of the agencies to appear in person to answer any questions.73 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
63 ibid, art 17. 
64 ibid, art 36. The agencies are tasked with the general role of developing systemic 
risk indicators and stress testing regimes in order to assist the ESRB in its systemic 
risk oversight, see arts 22-23. 
65 ibid, art 40. 
66 ibide, art 48. 
67 ibid, art 51. 
68 ibid, art 9. 
69 ibid, art 16. 
70 ibidarts 23 and 33. 
71 ibid, art 43. 
72 ibid, art 44. 
73 ibid, art 50. 
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The control and accountability channels designed for the three agencies 
are rather extensive in nature, and the agencies really only have their own 
discretion in the areas of supervisory convergence, 74  settlement of 
disagreements between national regulators,75 and to certain extent, work 
undertaken in the Joint Committee. 76  Although the Commission is 
represented at Joint Committee meetings, it is less certain how much 
influence and control such a representative has, and it is noted that the 
Joint Committee establishes it own sub-committees and decision-making 
procedures. Iglesias-Rodriguez 77  considers the main accountability 
mechanisms for the three agencies to lie in political accountability and 
control. Political accountability and control meet the immediate need of 
supporting the legitimacy of the three agencies. However, the longer term 
effects on the autonomy and technocratic leadership of the agencies need 
to be considered.78  
 
The power, control and accountability structures discussed so far are 
premised on a need to usher in the institution of financial regulation in the 
EU within politically acceptable parameters for the EU political 
institutions and Member States. The author of this article is of the view 
that the autonomy, independence and technocratic leadership of the 
agencies, although formally endorsed, are relatively more neglected 
attributes, and could be undermined by the extensive control and 
accountability mechanisms. Commentators argue that accountability is not 
contrary to independence,79 as independence gives rise to accountability 
for legitimacy purposes, and the lack of independence makes 
accountability an irrelevant issue. In the context of the three agencies 
however, the features of control discussed above are relatively extensive 
and should give rise to concerns as to the extent of independence really 
enjoyed by the agencies. The above has also discussed the nebulous nature 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
74 ibid, arts 21, 29-31. 
75 ibid, arts 19-20. Even then such needs to be reported to Parliament in annual 
reports, but annual reporting is routinely received by the Parliament in relation to so 
many agencies in the EU that Curtin argues that such a form of accountability does 
not particularly attract scrutiny, see Dierdre Curtin, ‘Delegation to EU Non – 
Majoritarian Agencies and Emerging Practices of Public Accountability’ in 
Regulation through Agencies: A New Paradigm of European Governance 87 (2005) at 
http://ssrn.com/abstract=1349771.  
76 EBA, ESMA and EIOPA Regulations, arts 54-56. 
77 Pablo Iglesias-Rodriguez, The Accountability of Financial Regulators (Wolters Kluwer 
2014), ch 6. 
78 ibid 241. 
79 Madalina Busuioc and Martijn Groenleer, ‘The Theory and Practice of EU Agency 
Autonomy and Accountability: Early Day Expectations, Today’s Realities and Future 
Perspectives’ in M Everson, C Monda and E Vos (eds), European Agencies in between 
Institutions and Member States (Kluwer Law International 2014 forthcoming); Eva 
Hüpkes, Marc Quintyn and Michael Taylor, ‘Accountability Arrangements for 
Financial Sector Regulators’ (IMF Economic Issues 2006) via 
http://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/issues/issues39/ei39.pdf.  
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of ex ante forms of political accountability which could act as ‘controls’. It 
may be argued that such control is necessary as falling within Meroni 
parameters, as the agencies cannot have law-making powers and are not in 
a position to determine breach of Union law. However, one queries why 
implementing technical standards that involve no strategic decision cannot 
be decided independently by the agencies, why the agencies should be 
subject to a threat of revocation in their standard-setting roles and why 
annual work programmes have to receive ex ante approval from political 
institutions? In other words, the article doubts that the extent of control, 
or control in the form of ex ante accountability, gives proportionate 
importance to the autonomy, independence and technocratic leadership of 
the agencies.  
  
The three agencies are also subject to accountability in terms of the 
reviewability of their decisions. Any natural or legal person including 
national regulators to whom a binding agency decision is addressed may 
appeal to the Board of Appeal constituted jointly by the three agencies.80 
The three agencies would appoint, from a Commission shortlist, four 
representatives each (two members and two alternates) from their 
Management Boards to sit on the Board of Appeal alongside other experts 
openly recruited.81 The Board of Appeal would consist of 6 members and 6 
alternates and every member is expected to act impartially and 
independently in deciding any appeal, with interested members refraining 
from sitting on the appeal.82 The Board of Appeal is required to provide 
resolution in an expeditious manner83 and is also required to make its 
procedures and its reasoned decisions public.84  The Board’s decisions are 
subject to appeal to the European Court of Justice and access to the Court 
is also available under Art 263 of the Treaty of the European Union where 
an Authority’s decision cannot be appealed85 to the Board of Appeal.86  
 
The three agencies are also subject to stakeholder accountability. The 
agencies are mandated to set up Stakeholder Groups of 30 individuals 
each,87 represented by the industry, users of financial services, employees’ 
representatives, consumers and at least five top-ranking academics in the 
field. These stakeholder groups are consulted upon in the processes 
leading up to drafting technical standards, implementing technical 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
80 EBA, ESMA and EIOPA Regulations, art 60. 
81 ibid, art 58. 
82 ibid, arts 58 and 59. 
83 Within two months of lodging an appeal. 
84 EBA, ESMA and EIOPA Regulations, art 60. 
85 ibid, art 61. 
86  However, Pieter Van Cleynenbreugel, ‘Judicial Protection against EU Financial 
Supervisory Authorities in the Wake of Regulatory Reform’ (2012) at 
http://ssrn.com/abstract=2194172 criticises that the judicial accountability is too 
narrow as being confined to persons directly affected by agency decisions and that 
the grounds in Art 263 may not encompass all possible grievances against the agencies. 
87 EBA, ESMA and EIOPA Regulations, art 37. 
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standards, and guidelines and recommendations, providing a form of input 
legitimacy to the agencies’ responsibilities. Iglesias-Rodriguez88 however 
notes that stakeholder groups tend to be industry-dominated and not well-
represented by consumer groups. At the moment no signs of regulatory 
capture have emerged in relation to industry participation in the agencies’ 
deliberations and in fact the Parliament review of the ESAs suggests that 
the ESAs have been taking care to refrain from being overly engaged with 
stakeholders. 89 
 
Where the ESRB is concerned, although its powers are non-binding in 
nature, it is subject to extensive input legitimacy mechanisms in terms of 
its accountability structure. Its General Board will be assisted by a Steering 
Committee90 made up of an even spread of representatives from the ESRB, 
the European Central Bank, the ESMA, EBA and EIOPA, the European 
Commission, the Economic and Financial Committee of the European 
Council, and the two advisory committees of the ESRB. The ESRB’s work 
will be assisted by an Advisory Scientific Committee91 which comprises of 
experts from across a wide range of fields and skills and the Advisory 
Technical Committee92 which consists of representatives from national 
central banks and EU-level representation. The representation feeding 
into the ESRB’s decision-making includes EU-level political interests, 
national interests as well as technocratic expertise. The design for 
representation internalises any potential contests between EU-level and 
national objectives, as well as political and technocratic objectives under 
the ESRB. However, this complex representation structure does in itself 
promise that effective mediation of contests of interests.  
 
In sum, the ESFS may appear to be an institutional set-up that is powerful 
and autonomous, but is actually underpinned by extensive inter-
governmentalism and controls by EU political institutions. The challenge 
for the ESFS is arguably to establish its identity and credibility in EU 
financial services regulation, and such a challenge may become more acute 
with the advent of the SSM that brings about a differentiated form of 
supervision for certain euro-area banks. 
 
The article argues that the very complexity of design in the ESFS could be 
used to overcome the weakness discussed above. The ESFS could leverage 
upon its inter-agency features to boost its autonomy, independence and 
credibility in becoming a technocratic, expert-led system for EU financial 
services regulation. The advantage of not being a single financial services 
regulatory institution is that the sectoral boundaries separating the 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
88 Pablo Iglesias-Rodriguez, The Accountability of Financial Regulators (Wolters Kluwer 
2014), ch 7. 
89 DG for Internal Policies, Parliament’s Review of the ESFS (2013). 
90 ESRB Regulation, art 11. 
91 ibid, art 12. 
92 ibid, art 13. 
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agencies promote non-homogenous approaches while inter-agency 
coordination and interactions foster crucial joined-up thinking. Inter-
agency coordination can be fostered for holistic perspectives in financial 
regulation, and develop the technocratic competence and credibility of 
individual institutions, overcoming the limitations that agencies face in 
view of controls over power. Over time, a sustained pattern of inter-agency 
coordination can even develop forms of inter-agency accountability that 
could be important in underlining the agencies’ legitimacy. The 
development of inter-agency accountability can even go towards reducing 
the need for extensive political controls over agencies.  
 
Part III will now go on to explore the inter-agency coordination of the 
three agencies in the Joint Committee and the Board of Appeal. Part III 
will discuss how inter-agency learning and coordination is developing in 
the ESFS and how such can help secure agency technocratic credibility and 
improve agency autonomy and independence at the same time. The 
potential for development of inter-agency accountability will also be 
highlighted.  
 
III. INTER-AGENCY LEARNING, COORDINATION, 
ACCOUNTABILITY AND ACHIEVEMENTS 
 
This Part argues that the three agencies EBA, ESMA and EIOPA have not 
merely succumbed to the limitations in their power structures and 
accountability mechanisms in carrying out their mandates. They have 
taken steps to develop those areas of their responsibilities where they may 
act relatively more independently, such as in consumer protection,93  and 
are developing their technocratic credibility as autonomous agencies in EU 
financial regulation. 94  In particular, the article argues that the three 
agencies are augmenting their fields of independence by developing 
expertise in areas under the purview of the Joint Committee. Inter-agency 
coordination has arguably provided a platform for increased learning, 
accountability and fostering of independence of the agencies as 
technocratic expert-led outfits. This is a form of inter-dependence that 
reinforces the three agencies’ scope of work and the development of their 
technocratic expertise. Such inter-dependence boosts the autonomy, 
independence and technocratic leadership of each agency, and also has the 
potential of enhancing accountability through inter-agency transparency 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
93As commended by the European Commission’s review of the ESFS, see European 
Commission, Report from the Commission to the European Parliament and the Council on the 
operation of the European Supervisory Authorities (ESAs) and the European System of 
Financial Supervision (ESFS) (7 August 2014). 
94 Observed by stakeholders in DG for Internal Policies, Parliament’s Review of the 
ESFS (2013), and also commended in European Commission, Report from the 
Commission to the European Parliament and the Council on the operation of the European 
Supervisory Authorities (ESAs) and the European System of Financial Supervision (ESFS) (7 
August 2014). 
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and coordination. This Part explores the dynamics and achievements of 
such inter-agency learning and accountability. 
 
1. Joint Committee 
The Joint Committee of the three agencies is to comprise of the 
Chairpersons of each agency and the Executive Directors of each agency, a 
representative from the Commission and ESRB respectively, who would be 
observers at the meetings.95 The Joint Committee is established to ensure 
cooperation and cross-sectoral consistency in policy areas such as financial 
conglomerates, accounting and auditing, micro-prudential analyses of 
cross-sectoral developments, risks and vulnerabilities for financial stability, 
retail investment products, measures combating money laundering, and 
information exchange with the ESRB and developing the relationship 
between the ESRB and the agencies.96 In particular, the Joint Committee 
may establish sub-committees dedicated to technocratic leadership in the 
above areas, but a mandatory sub-committee on Financial Conglomerates 
must be established.97 The Joint Committee is also the forum for joint 
decisions and positions to be adopted among the three agencies.98 
 
This Section argues that the Joint Committee has developed to be a 
platform for the three agencies to develop inter-agency coordination and 
learning that further enhances each agency’s autonomy, independence and 
technocratic leadership. Furthermore, inter-agency interactions promote 
transparency between the agencies. Although such transparency is not 
necessarily publicly visible, such interactions can promote enhanced 
accountability for each agency’s technocratic development and 
performance. This Part will mention a few examples gathered from the 
publicly available documents of the Joint Committee, although a 
comprehensive trawl and analysis of all Joint Committee documents has 
not been conducted for the purposes of this article. 
 
First, the Joint Committee has established a procedure of decision-making 
that involves consensus of the three Chairpersons.99 Disagreements would 
result in reconsiderations of issues which would then be subject to 
decision-making again. This procedure fosters inter-agency transparency, 
sharing, learning and negotiation and can contribute towards enhancing 
the technocratic development in each agency. The coordination and 
interaction between the agencies pursuant to Joint Committee work has 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
95 EBA, ESMA and EIOPA Regulations, art 55. 
96 ibid, art 54. 
97 ibid, art 57. 
98 ibid, art 56. 
99 Decision of the Joint Committee of the European Banking Authority, European 
Insurance and Occupational Pensions Authority, and European Securities and 
Markets Authority adopting the Rules of Procedure of the Joint Committee of the 
European Supervisory Authorities (21 June 2011). 
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led to greater cross-sectoral training that could enhance each agency’s 
technocratic expertise.100 
 
Next, the three agencies have established increased numbers of sub-
committees under the purview of the Joint Committee, suggesting that 
they are increasingly taking a stake in providing technocratic leadership in 
policy development, and not merely doing the minimal to cooperate in the 
matters set out in their instituting legislations. Besides the mandatory 
Financial Conglomerates sub-committee, the Joint Committee established 
a sub-committee on Cross-sectoral Developments, Risks and 
Vulnerabilities, a sub-committee on Money Laundering, a sub-committee 
on Consumer Protection and Financial Innovation, which has formed 
three sub-groups to deal specifically with cross-selling and complaints-
handling, 101  product governance and oversight and draft technical 
standards for packaged retail investor products (PRIPs). 102  The sub-
committee on Financial Conglomerates has championed 103  for wider 
supervisory remit over groups of financial institutions that may pose cross-
sectoral and systemic risks, positioning its technocratic leadership on one 
of the Joint Committee’s fundamental remits.  It has also developed 
standards for supervisory convergence in the oversight of financial 
conglomerates. 104  The sub-committee on Cross-sectoral Developments, 
Risks and Vulnerabilities is responsible for delivering the bi-annual report 
on cross-sectoral market developments, risks and vulnerabilities in the EU 
which the three agencies are tasked to prepare for the Commission, 
Parliament and Council. The Joint Committee notes its increasing 
expertise as a risk intelligence gatherer and monitor, and the usefulness of 
the reports feeding into the Council’s ECOFIN Financial Stability 
Table.105  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
100  Joint Committee Work Programme (2013) at 
http://www.esma.europa.eu/sk/system/files/jc-2013-002.pdf; and Joint Committee 
Work Programme 2014, via http://www.esma.europa.eu/sk/system/files/jc-2014-
051_2014_work_programme_of_the_joint_committee_of_the_esas.pdf. 
101 See Joint Committee, Joint Committee Consultation Paper on Guidelines for Cross-
Selling Practices (22 December 2014) at 
http://www.esma.europa.eu/system/files/jc_cp_2014_05_consultation_paper_on_cross
_selling.pdf. 
102  Joint Committee Work Programme 2013 at 
http://www.esma.europa.eu/sk/system/files/jc-2013-002.pdf. 
103 EBA, EIOPA and ESMA’s Response to the European Commission’s Call for Advice on the 
Fundamental Review of the Financial Conglomerates Directive (2012) at 
http://www.esma.europa.eu/sk/system/files/jc_2012_88.pdf;  
104 Joint Committee, Joint Guidelines on the Convergence of Supervisory Practices 
Relating to the Consistency of Supervisory Coordination Arrangements for Financial 
Conglomerates (22 December 2014) at 
http://www.esma.europa.eu/system/files/jc_gl_2014_01_joint_guidelines_on_coordinat
ion_arrangements_for_financial_conglomerates.pdf.  
105  Joint Committee Work Programme 2014, at 
http://www.esma.europa.eu/sk/system/files/jc-2014-
051_2014_work_programme_of_the_joint_committee_of_the_esas.pdf. 
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This Section also observes that significant strides have been taken by the 
Joint Committee in consumer protection, and these establish the 
technocratic expertise of all three agencies in developing EU-wide 
standards in leading consumer protection agendas and policies. The 
Parliamentary review106 of the agencies has pointed out that the EBA is 
relatively weaker than ESMA in developing consumer protection thinking, 
but the work in the Joint Committee has facilitated inter-agency learning 
in this regard. The Joint Consumer day in 2014107 allows inter-agency cross-
fertilisation of ideas and exchange with stakeholders too. EIOPA has also 
significantly benefited from ESMA’s leadership in consumer protection 
thinking and policy development.108 ESMA’s and EIOPA’s annual reports 
in 2013109 for example reflect a largely similar position on focusing on 
improving consumer protection in retail financial services. Furthermore, 
the EBA and ESMA have also learnt from EIOPA in developing a 
common consumer complaint-handling policy110 which is relevant across 
the sectors due to cross-selling activities in the financial sector.   
 
The three agencies are also taking technocratic leadership on new issues 
that have arisen in the regulatory sphere that are cross-sectoral in nature 
although not specifically mandated in the instituting legislations, such as in 
reviewing mechanistic reliance on credit ratings, 111  and the review of 
benchmark setting and regulation of the relevant processes.112 In particular, 
in the review of mechanistic reliance on credit ratings, the three agencies 
have laid down in a single comparable document references in rules and 
guidelines under their respective purview which could be a form of 
mechanistic reliance on credit ratings. This tabling and comparative 
approach forces each agency to consider objectively the purpose and 
consequences of the relevant rules and guidelines in order to determine the 
best way forward. The agencies have noted learning from ESMA in the 
process, as ESMA provides for discretion to be exercised on the part of the 
regulated entities to consider the impact of rating changes and therefore 
does not mandate a mechanistic approach.113  
 
Although these developments are rather specific in nature, one notes that 
the Joint Committee has pursued technocratic leadership eagerly within its 
express remit and beyond, where new issues arise. Such inter-agency 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
106 DG for Internal Policies, Parliament’s Review of the ESFS (2013). 
107 Joint ESAs consumer protection day 4 June 2014. 
108 Discussed in relation to consumer protection day, above. 
109 ESMA Annual Report 2013, EIOPA Annual Report 2013. 
110 Joint Committee, Final Report on Guidelines for Complaints-handling for the Securities 
(ESMA) and Banking (EBA) sectors, and CP (November 2013). 
111 Joint Consultation Paper on Mechanistic References to Credit Ratings (November 2013), 
Final Report (February 2014). 
112 Joint Committee, Letter on Possible Framework for the Regulation of the Production and 
Use of Indices Serving as Benchmarks in Financial and other Contracts (November 2013). 
113 Joint Consultation Paper on Mechanistic References to Credit Ratings Final Report (Feb 
2014). 
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coordination has fed into the technocratic development of each agency, 
such as the EBA and EIOPA in consumer protection, ESMA in financial 
stability oversight, overall strengthening the autonomy and effectiveness of 
each agency. 114  Furthermore, inter-agency coordination compels 
transparency, sharing and learning amongst agencies and such can add to 
inter-agency accountability which supports the autonomy and technocratic 
effectiveness of the agencies. Inter-agency accountability would serve a 
different purpose from the political and stakeholder channels of 
accountability that serve the purposes of ‘perception legitimacy’. Inter-
agency accountability can be a promising development in improving agency 
effectiveness in terms of autonomous and objective decision-making in 
technocratic expertise that is depoliticised and neutral. 
 
2. Inter-agency Learning and the Board of Appeal 
The Board of Appeal is also a forum for inter-agency learning to take place, 
and this article argues that the three decisions that have been issued by the 
Board to date provide many constructive points of feedback and learning 
for the three agencies. Inter-agency coordination on the Board provides 
opportunities for scrutiny into agency processes and practices and 
constitutes a form of inter-agency accountability which is also available for 
public scrutiny. The author is not aware of any appeal to the CJEU against 
the Board of Appeal’s decisions yet, but any such appeal would also provide 
learning opportunities not only for the agencies but also for inter-agency 
coordination and accountability. 
 
The first decision concerns the complaint made by SV Capital Oü against 
the EBA.115 In this case, SV Capital had been assigned a claim by Instmark 
Oü which raised a matter to the EBA regarding the suitability of persons 
directing the Estonian branches of Finnish Bank Nordea in Estonia. The 
original claimant operated a current account at a Nordea branch in Estonia 
which was frozen due to money laundering concerns. The Estonian court 
subsequently decided that the action taken by Nordea was illegal and that 
the declarations made by two governors of the Nordea branch regarding 
the non-existence of certain documents between Instmark and Nordea 
were untrue. SV Capital raised a concern to the Estonian financial 
regulator that the two governors of the Nordea branch ought to be 
removed if their credibility had been doubted in court. The Estonian 
authority directed SV Capital to the Finnish home authority with 
supervisory powers and jurisdiction over the Nordea branch. The Finnish 
home authority rejected SV Capital’s complaint. SV Capital brought the 
matter to the EBA to allege that the Finnish authority had breached 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
114 Inter-agency learning is still nevertheless in an early stage as the Parliamentary 
review notes that the EBA and EIOPA are inundated with their respective draft 
technical standards work in micro-prudential regulation and Solvency II respectively 
and EBA’s stress testing developments have also pre-occupied the EBA significantly. 
See DG for Internal Policies, Parliament’s Review of the ESFS (2013). 
115 Decision of the Board of Appeal in SV Capital Oü v EBA (Frankfurt, 24 June 2013). 
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Union law by not removing unsuitable persons from directing the Nordea 
branch in Estonia. The EBA’s response was not to take the matter further 
as it regarded itself as having no jurisdiction to intervene in matters of 
corporate governance other than in the parent credit institution. On 
appeal to the Board of Appeal, the Board considered that the EBA had 
interpreted its remit too narrowly and that the EBA could intervene in 
matters regarding the corporate governance of key branches such as the 
Estonian branch of Nordea, in relation to key function holders that could 
include persons directing the branches. The matter was remitted to the 
EBA. However, the EBA ultimately decided not to investigate into the 
matter as a breach of Union law as it considered the Finnish regulator’s 
explanation that the two persons concerned were not key function holders 
in the branch to be adequate. SV Capital raised an appeal to the Board 
regarding the EBA’s decision, alleging that the EBA refused to investigate 
the matter due to its fears of damaging relations with national regulators, 
that it was not pursuing its responsibilities robustly, and that the EBA 
should always prefer to investigate than otherwise. The Board of Appeal 
reviewed the EBA’s decision and was of the view that the decision not to 
investigate was based on a reasoned reliance on the Finnish home 
authority’s assessment of the importance or otherwise of the two persons 
to the Estonian branch.116 The conclusion made that those two were not 
key function holders was one that could be upheld by the EBA and the 
Board did not find blind reliance or a less than robust culture at the EBA 
dealing with national regulators. 
 
The two appeals brought by SV Capital against the EBA provided 
opportunities for high level scrutiny of the EBA’s understanding of its 
remit, its relations with national regulators and the division of regulatory 
responsibilities between them. The first case demonstrated the EBA’s 
tentativeness in assuming a wide remit and this may highlight the 
hesitation experienced in the first steps of a new agency. The conclusion 
made by the Board of Appeal in interpreting the EBA’s remit in overseeing 
corporate governance matters is important in consolidating the identity of 
the EBA and its understanding of its scope of responsibilities and powers.  
Furthermore, the Board of Appeals’ scrutiny into the EBA’s rationale for 
its decision not to investigate and its decision-making processes helps the 
EBA in consolidating its independent decision-making capacity, neither to 
be captured by national regulators nor to be compelled by the industry. 
 
The second appeal117 is in relation to ESMA’s decision not to register a 
Ukrainian credit rating agency incorporated in the UK as an authorised 
credit ratings provider that could disseminate ratings in the EU. Global 
Private Ratings Company ‘Standard Rating’ Ltd (GPRC) was suspected by 
the UK Financial Services Authority to be undertaking credit rating 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
116 Decision of the Board of Appeal in SV Capital Oü v EBA (Frankfurt, 14 July 2014). 
117 Decision of the Board of Appeal in Global Private Rating Company ‘Standard 
Rating’ Ltd v ESMA (Frankfurt, 10 January 2014). 
2015]         The EU Financial Regulatory Architecture       90 
	  
activities without authorisation in 2013 and ESMA was duly informed. 
ESMA then wrote to GPRC to require registration or cessation of 
activities. GPRC submitted an application to ESMA after a few 
correspondences and provided an application that was notified as 
‘complete’ by ESMA. However, GPRC was denied registration after 
ESMA’s compliance team took the view that GPRC was not in compliance 
with the substantive requirements of the Annex to the Credit Rating 
Agencies Regulation. GPRC contested 12 grounds of ESMA’s decision. 
The Board of Appeal held that only one ground of ESMA’s decision was 
not well-founded. Based on the appellant’s failure to convince the Board 
that much of ESMA’s grounds of decision were not well-founded, the 
Board dismissed GPRC’s appeal. 
 
Although the Board of Appeal upheld ESMA’s decision not to register 
GPRC, the criticism made by GPRC against ESMA’s grounds of decision 
highlighted the challenges for ESMA as a new regulatory body and the 
lessons that ESMA needed to learn. A number of ESMA’s requirements 
for registration were in a qualitative manner that allowed ESMA to decide 
in its discretion whether an applicant satisfied the substantive 
requirements in question. Hence, the GPRC alleged that such 
requirements were unclear or opaque and did not provide adequate 
guidance on what was expected. For example, the applicant had to 
demonstrate that the applicant had adequate systems, resources and 
confidentiality safeguards. GPRC did not in ESMA’s view demonstrate 
that it had adequate IT systems. GPRC contended that IT systems were 
being finalised and were constantly evolving anyway and that ESMA did 
not engage in adequate dialogue with GPRC to make an informed 
determination. The Board held that GPRC had the onus to satisfy ESMA 
of such adequacy and this was not done. The author of this article is of the 
view that the Board’s conclusion is sound, but this example highlights the 
need for ESMA to learn from its experience of being scrutinised as it steps 
into the role of directly regulating credit rating agencies, and there is 
perhaps need to develop more precise guidelines and criteria to bridge the 
expectations between the regulator and the regulated, even if the 
empowering legislation is in favour of the regulator exercising a widely 
worded form of discretion. Overall, the author is of the view that ESMA 
rightly exercised the discretion not to register GPRC as its objective to 
safeguard the credibility of ratings issued in the EU would likely be 
compromised if it approved of an applicant while not being sufficiently 
satisfied that the latter was demonstrating a robust set-up, governance and 
work procedures. The author agrees that the onus lies on the applicant to 
satisfy ESMA of its eligibility under the published legislative standards, 
albeit widely worded, although this is no excuse for ESMA not to develop 
clarity in its criteria and to make transparent its decision-making processes. 
 
The Board also stated that ‘the registration of a credit rating agency is a 
new process, and recognises that the procedures will to an extent take time 
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fully to work out.’118 The decision of the Board is measured and provides a 
constructive learning opportunity for ESMA to consider whether it can do 
more to provide guidance in terms of how its discretion may be exercised, 
so that any perceived opacity in terms of ESMA’s expectations in the eyes 
of the regulated community may be addressed. 
 
The two decisions have provided a good measure of insight into the inter-
agency scrutiny, learning and feedback that could be carried out at the 
level of the Board of Appeal. Such decisions also go some way towards 
supporting the consolidation of agency identity, understanding of scope of 
responsibilities and powers, development of robust and credible practices 
and reinforcing agency autonomy and effectiveness generally. This Part has 
so far argued that the Joint Committee and Board of Appeal have provided 
the platforms for inter-agency learning and accountability to become an 
avenue for the consolidation of autonomy and effectiveness on the part of 
the three agencies. The next section reviews the literature and general 
arguments for inter-agency learning and accountability. 
 
3. Inter-agency Coordination and Accountability Generally 
Seidman and Gilmour, scholars of public administration, have likened 
inter-agency coordination to ‘the twentieth-century equivalent of the 
medieval search for the philosopher’s stone’ that would answer all the 
problems of public administration’. 119  Inter-agency coordination is 
necessary for government and the administrative state, but is fraught with 
challenges from the political, organisational and behavioural points of view. 
The rise of the administrative state is often viewed as a necessary form of 
‘regulatory capitalism’, 120  but the institution of agencies with specific 
remits may create a cluster of over-specialised administrative bodies with 
myopic visions and insular cultures, lacking in joined-up thinking. Li and 
Chan121 suggest that inter-agency coordination could promote information 
sharing, increased capacity and joined-up thinking to deal with unexpected 
contingencies and large-scale problems, as well as mutual reinforcement of 
each agency’s responsibilities. They advocate this form of public 
administration in solving China’s vast problem of urban pollution. Freeman 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
118 ibid, para 188. 
119 Harold Siedman and R Gilmour, Politics, Position, and Power: From the Positive to the 
Regulatory State (OUP 1986),  219ff.  
120 David Levi-Faur, ‘The Global Diffusion of Regulatory Capitalism’ (2005) 598 The 
ANNALS of the American Academy of Political and Social Science 12, 
Giandomenico Majone, ‘The Rise of the Regulatory State’ (2007) 17 Western 
European Politics 77; Damien Geradin, ‘The Development of European Regulatory 
Agencies: What the EU Should Learn from American Experience’ (2004) 11 
Columbia Journal of European Law 1. 
121 W Li and Hon S Chan, ‘Clean Air in Urban China: The Case of Inter-Agency 
Coordination in Chongqing’s Blue Sky Program’ (2009) 29 Public Administration and 
Development 55. 
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and Rossi122 also argue that inter-agency coordination holds much promise 
for pooling of resources and overall better and more transaction-cost 
efficient decision-making. Ongoing inter-agency coordination may 
promote the construction of a better information matrix, mutual trust 
between agencies and greater willingness to cooperate. Each agency can 
then pull its weight and develop more effective solutions especially in 
unexpected emergency situations.123 This could be especially relevant for 
the ESFS entities in their roles to safeguard financial stability in the EU. 
 
Although fears and suspicions could be directed at inter-agency 
coordination as being potentially a form of agency collusion and 
consolidation of administrative power over regulated entities, the 
individual identities and purposes of agencies may counteract those 
tendencies, and instead produce an effect of inter-agency accountability. 
Freeman and Rossi,124 as well as Di Noia and Gargantini125 suggest that 
inter-agency accountability, a form of horizontal accountability, is useful 
for promoting better technocratic solutions as agencies may be less likely 
to succumb to regulatory capture, insular culture or regulatory arbitrage by 
the regulated entities.   
Erkkilä126 also argues that networked entities are in relationships of mutual 
accountability vis-a-vis each other as their technocratic nature allows them 
to act as peers in monitoring each other’s discharge of responsibilities. Due 
to the technocratic nature of agencies,127 inter-agency accountability may 
also be more effective in scrutinising the quality of professional 
performance of the agency than popular channels of accountability. 
 
Although inter-agency accountability is not as well-studied as popular 
channels of accountability such as political, judicial and stakeholder 
accountability, it is important to explore this channel of accountability as 
it serves a complementary and important purpose to popular channels of 
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(2012) 125 Harvard Law Review 1134. 
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accountability. Dubnick et al 128  argue that multiple channels of 
accountability for agencies are important as they are located in networks, 
and function like organic systems that seek to respond to the needs in the 
regulatory space. 
  
In the EU context, particularly in new institutional architecture such as 
the ESFS, the SSM and SRM, it is important to explore how the design of 
such architecture meets the needs of credibility, effectiveness and 
legitimacy. This article has observed that due to concerns for appropriate 
restraint of power and popular accountability, the ESFS has been subject 
to complex design. However, such complex design poses potential 
handicaps to the technocratic development of the ESFS. The author 
acknowledges the necessity of those constraints such as in line with Treaty 
parameters and the Meroni doctrine, but suggests that the inter-agency 
nature of the institutional architecture can be exploited to enhance the 
technocratic leadership and effectiveness, as well as the accountability of 
the ESFS entities. It is submitted that further empirical research should be 
carried out on the nature of inter-agency accountability so that indicators 
can be developed for the maturation of this area of study. Such indicators 
can provide a roadmap for the development of more formal mechanisms in 
inter-agency accountability in order to enhance the purposes served by this 
form of accountability in ensuring agency effectiveness and output 
legitimacy. 
 
The article now turns to the second stage of institutional development in 
the EU’s financial regulation framework, the SSM and SRM. The SSM and 
SRM are also complex designs that reflect the compromises made 
allocating the power in micro-prudential supervision and the crisis 
resolution of key banks in the euro-area. These complex designs raise 
issues regarding how the balance of technocratic effectiveness and power 
structures can be achieved. Section 3 will argue that the inter-agency model 
in the ESFS provides useful insights for the SSM and SRM. These 
perspectives may be a starting point but can be used to develop future 
institutional design changes to secure an optimal balance in technocratic 
effectiveness and power structures. 
 
IV. THE SSM, SRM AND LESSONS THAT CAN BE LEARNT WITH 
RESPECT TO INTER-AGENCY COORDINATION 
 
The SSM and SRM may be regarded as the second stage in reforming 
financial regulatory architecture in the EU. The continued weakness of 
many European banks post the global financial crisis affected market 
confidence and economic recovery in the EU, and the SSM was introduced 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
128 Melvin J Dubnick and H George Frederickson (eds), Accountable Governance: 
Problems and Promises (2010) Schillemann and Boven, reviewed by Thomas J Grietens, 
‘Moving the Study of Accountability Forward’ (2012) 44 State and Local Government 
Review 76. 
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to sever the links between weak sovereigns and national banks with poor 
balance sheets, in order to provide a more credible system of supervision 
and backstop for those banks.129 Troeger,130 however, argues that this is a 
poor reason for the SSM as it would only focus the SSM’s attention on the 
most weakly disciplined banks to rectify their problems. In other words, 
he views the institution of the SSM as created not for reasons of coherence 
in regulatory ideology or architecture, but for fire-fighting the excesses due 
to poor national oversight. It remains to be seen if the priorities of the 
SSM may affect the inter-relationships between the SSM and the ESFS. 
 
The SSM is a network comprising the ECB and national regulators. 
Certain responsibilities and tasks are conferred on the ECB, and national 
regulators are to act as the ECB’s assistants and delegates. The ECB is 
empowered in the SSM to undertake microprudential supervision of banks 
that are not ‘less significant’131 in the euro area and banks of countries that 
have entered into close cooperation with the SSM.132 Such supervisory 
tasks include authorisation of credit institutions, ensuring compliance with 
micro-prudential legislation, stress testing and supervisory review,  
overseeing recovery plans and carrying out early intervention. To this end, 
the ECB may adopt guidelines and recommendations issued by the EBA or 
may issue its own to the end that is necessary for its responsibilities, 
subject to public consultation before the adoption of any such guidelines 
or recommendations.133 However, as the ECB will not have responsibility 
over all banks in the euro area, national regulators remain responsible for 
those banks, subject to a reporting duty to the ECB.134  
 
The SSM is to be independent of the ECB’s monetary function.135 It is to 
be governed by a Board of Supervisors136 comprising a Chair and Vice-
Chair, four ECB representatives and a representative of each national 
regulator in the Member States subject to the SSM. The Chairperson is to 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
129  Guido Ferranini and Luigi Chiarella, ‘Common Banking Supervision in the 
Eurozone: Strengths and Weaknesses’ (2013) at http://ssrn.com/abstract_id=2309897. 
130  Tobias H Troeger, ‘The Single Supervisory Mechanism –Panacea or Quack 
Banking Regulation?’ (2013) at http://ssrn.com/abstract=2311353. 
131 ie banks with assets totalling 30 billion euros or more, or ratio of total assets over 
the GDP of the relevant Member State exceeds 20 %, unless the total value of its 
assets is below 5 billion euros, an institution regarded by the national regulator as 
significant, an institution regarded by the ECB on its own initiative as significant, 
any institution receiving public financial assistance, and at least the three key banks 
in every euro area jurisdiction or member state in close cooperation. SSM Regulation, 
art 6. 
132 SSM Regulation, art 7. 
133 ibid, art 4. 
134 This seems to be a balanced form of necessary centralisation according to what 
may be most efficient and proportionate, see Jean-Edouard Colliard, ‘Monitoring the 
Supervisors: Optimal Regulatory Architecture in a Banking Union’ (2014) at 
http://ssrn.com/abstract=2274164; SSM Regulation, art 6. 
135 SSM Regulation, arts 19 and 25. 
136 ibid, art 26. 
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be appointed by open selection with Parliament and Council duly 
informed, while the Vice-Chair is to be appointed from the Board. The 
appointments are not particularly subject to political control, in line with 
the fierce boundaries of independence hitherto maintained by the ECB. 
Due to Treaty constraints, however, the Board of Supervisors is not able to 
adopt decisions for the SSM as such or the institution of the SSM may 
require Treaty change. Hence, the Board will send draft decisions to be 
adopted by the Governing Council of the ECB, which would be deemed to 
have accepted if no objection is raised in a maximum of 10 days.137  
 
The introduction of the ECB’s leadership in the SSM as part of the 
financial regulation fabric at the EU may result in a marked power 
imbalance between the ESFS institutions and the ECB. Such institutional 
‘imbalance’ has been observed and raised by a number of commentators.138 
In contrast to the three agencies in the ESFS, the ECB has been an 
established and independent institution in the EU and the fear is that the 
maturing ESFS institutions may be adversely affected, especially the EBA. 
A number of commentators are concerned that the SSM will introduce a 
form of differentiated integration139 in euro area banking regulation and 
undermine the EBA’s work in this area.140Although the SSM is a member 
of and subject to the EBA, the ECB has the power to adopt its own 
supervisory guidelines and recommendations, and in carrying out national 
supervision, it would be applying nationally transposed versions of the 
Capital Requirements Directive IV which could reinforce certain national 
peculiarities. The leadership of the ECB in the SSM may result in the 
bifurcation of regulatory approaches for the euro area and the non-euro 
area. Such bifurcation or differentiation is not exactly ideal as cross-border 
banking in the EU is not so starkly divided along those lines, and the 
regulation of banks with pan-European footprint would benefit from 
joined-up thinking, the need for which formed the basis for the de 
Larosière recommendations for instituting the ESFS in the first place. The 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
137 ibid, art 26. Ferran and Babis argue that this is adverse to non-euro area Member 
States in close cooperation as those Member States would not have a representative 
in the Governing Council, see Eilis Ferran and Valia SG Babis, ‘The European Single 
Supervisory Mechanism’ (2013) JCLS 255. 
138 Some queries have been raised in Benedikt Wolfers and Thomas Voland, ‘Level 
the Playing Field: The New Supervision of Credit Institutions by the European 
Central Bank’ (2014) 51 Common Market Law Review 1463. 
139 Donato Masciandaro, Maria J Nieto and Marc Quintyn, ‘Will They Sing the Same 
Tune? Measuring Convergence in the new European System of Financial Supervisors’ 
(IMF Working Paper 2009) at http://ssrn.com/abstract=442244 suggests that central 
bank leadership in microprudential supervision generally fragments regulatory 
architecture in financial regulation. 
140 Eilis Ferran and Valia SG Babis, ‘The European Single Supervisory Mechanism’ 
(2013) JCLS 255; Klaus Lackoff, ‘The Framework Regulation (FR) for the Single 
Supervisory Mechanism (SSM) - An Overview’ (2014) 29 JIBLR 498, ‘How will the 
Single Supervisory Mechanism (SSM) Function? A Brief Overview’ (2014) 29 JIBLR 
13; Concetta Brescia Morra, ‘From the Single Supervisory Mechanism to the Banking 
Union: The Role of the ECB and the EBA’ (2013) at http://ssrn.com/abstract=2448913. 
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potential of the ECB to undermine the regulatory convergence role of the 
EBA would arguably be due to its relatively more established and powerful 
profile, the internalisation of an array of supervisory arrangements that 
could become insular vis a vis the ESFS, and the relatively lesser demands 
in accountability that reinforce its power. 
 
The SSM is subject to no discernible ex ante political controls as even the 
appointment of the Chairperson of the Board of Supervisors is not subject 
to political control. The SSM is accountable to the Council and 
Parliament141 via annual reporting and the Chairperson may be asked to 
appear before the euro group in the Council or committees of the 
Parliament. The annual reports are also to be laid before national 
parliaments142 of the Member States subject to the SSM, and national 
parliaments may request for the ECB’s written explanations on matters 
raised by them. The ECB is also subject to accountability to regulated 
entities to whom it addresses its decisions. It has established an 
Administrative Board of Review143 to deal with requests to review its 
decisions, to comprise of five independent banking and finance experts 
appointed by the ECB. The Board’s decisions also need to be adopted by 
the Governing Council in the same way mentioned above. The largely ex 
post reporting accountability for the SSM highlights the extent of ECB 
independence and discretion in the discharge of its tasks, very distinct 
from the institutions in the ESFS. The incentives for the ECB to engage in 
inter-agency accountability are arguably low as inter-agency accountability 
may be seen as an impediment to the wide berth of discretion enjoyed in 
its power and accountability structures. 
 
There are certain junctures of inter-relationships between the SSM and 
ESFS.  In the discharge of its responsibilities, the SSM is required under its 
instituting legislation to work with the institutions in the ESFS144 to 
consider how financial regulation may be effectively administered in the 
EU as a whole, put in place a system of coordination and delegation with 
participating Member State regulators 145  and conclude memoranda of 
understanding with non-participating Member State regulators and with all 
Member States’ securities regulators. 146  The ECB would also be a 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
141 SSM Regulation, art 20. 
142 ibid, art 21. 
143 ibid, art 24. 
144 ibid, art 3. 
145 ibid, art 6. 
146 ibid, art 3. It is uncertain yet how such coordination would work out but the 
European Commission is decisively of the view that ‘The establishment of a Banking 
Union, and notably of the Single Supervisory Mechanism (SSM) and the Single 
Resolution Mechanism (SRM) as its key components, will impact the functioning of 
the ESFS, but does not call into question its existence and necessity.’ See European 
Commission, Report from the Commission to the European Parliament and the Council on the 
operation of the European Supervisory Authorities (ESAs) and the European System of 
Financial Supervision (ESFS) (7 August 2014), 4. 
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participating member of the EBA.147 In order to address the concerns of 
Member States that are not subject to the SSM, readjusted voting rights 
for these Member States148 (i.e. to have these Member States’ votes count 
in a separate class) have been introduced in the structure of decision-
making in the EBA. However, this article predicts that institutional 
imbalance between the SSM and the ESFS could entail the following 
consequences: (a) the lack of synergies in micro-prudential regulation may 
ensue if the coordination between the ECB and the EBA does not take off, 
and the EBA could reassert its identity and authority by focusing more on 
areas that do not overlap with micro-prudential regulation, such as conduct 
regulation and the areas of inter-agency coordination in the Joint 
Committee; or (b) the EBA could compel the ECB to fall in line with its 
standards for convergence where it has the mandate to ensure such 
convergence, e.g.  supervisory convergence, stress-testing and recovery and 
resolution plans, 149 but it remains to be seen if boundary issues between 
the ECB and EBA may impede the effectiveness of either agency’s 
discharge of responsibilities. Furthermore, it is questioned if the ESRB 
may be relegated in view of the SSM,150 as the ECB has certain specific 
macro-prudential powers151 in respect of requiring extra capital buffers to 
be put in place, although the CRD IV152 designates the ESRB as the body 
that recommends whether any counter-cyclical buffer for any Member 
State should be introduced.  
 
In sum, the imbalance between power and accountability structures of the 
SSM and the ESFS institutions may result in uncertain prospects for the 
achievement of technocratic effectiveness by all institutions concerned. 
Commentators do question the necessary superiority of central banks in 
micro-prudential supervision, 153  and the ECB’s role in the episode 
regarding the rescue of Cyprus’ banks in 2013 was not a particularly 
applauded one.154 This article suggests that some lessons can be learnt from 
the ESFS in order to secure some of the advantages in relation to 
enhancement to technocratic effectiveness, accountability and legitimacy 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
147 ibid. 
148 Regulation (EU) No 1022/2013 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 
22 October 2013 amending Regulation (EU) No 1093/2010 establishing a European 
Supervisory Authority (European Banking Authority) as regards the conferral of 
specific tasks on the European Central Bank pursuant to Council Regulation (EU) 
No 1024/2013 [2013] OJ L 287/5, amendment to art 44 of the EBA Regulation. 
149 Francesco Guarracino, ‘Role and Powers of the ECB and of the EBA:  In the 
Perspective of the Forthcoming Single Supervisory Mechanism’ (2014) at 
http://ssrn.com/abstract=2319136. 
150 Eddy Wymeersch, ‘The Single Supervisory Mechanism or “SSM”, Part One of the 
Banking Union’ (2014) NBB Working Paper. 
151 SSM Regulation, art 5. 
152 CRD IV Directive, arts 125-126. 
153 Donato Masciandaro and Maria J Nieto, ‘Governance of the Single Supervisory 
Mechanism: Some Reflections’ (2013) at http://ssrn.com/abstract=2384594. 
154 ‘Cyprus plans capital controls and bank restructuring as ECB sets ultimatum - as it 
happened’, The Guardian (21 March 2013). 
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as discussed earlier. In particular, the SSM could be subject to more overt 
inter-agency learning and coordination with the ESFS. For example, where 
there may be boundary contests between the SSM and EBA such as in 
micro-prudential standard setting, the express institution of inter-agency 
coordination and learning in those respects may provide opportunities for 
joined-up thinking in both the setting of micro-prudential regulatory and 
supervisory standards. This article is not advocating that joined-up 
thinking necessarily means uniform thinking or one-size-fits-all standards 
across the EU. Such joined-up thinking is necessary so that issues of 
convergence or uniformity, or differentiation, where it is warranted, are 
considered holistically and coherently. Such formal inter-agency 
coordination could mitigate the risk of inefficient bifurcation in the 
regulatory regimes for euro-area and non euro-area banks.   
 
It may, however, be argued that a new form of inter-agency coordination 
and accountability that checks on the ECB’s powers in the SSM is 
instituted in the form of the Single Resolution Mechanism (SRM).  A 
number of commentators have at the early discussions regarding the 
institution of the SSM voiced concerns regarding the lack of a supporting 
single resolution mechanism which is necessary to complete the picture for 
effective centralised micro-prudential supervision.155 Ferran argues that the 
SRM together with the SSM is necessary to make the integrated market in 
banks work and to prevent re-nationisation of banks in the EU.156 The 
SRM has been finalised in July 2014.157 
 
The SRM establishes a single resolution mechanism for banks subject to 
the SSM. The SRM is to be directed by a Board (SRB), which is an 
independent agency with separate legal personality independent of the 
ECB,158 and will be responsible for drafting resolution plans, adopting early 
intervention measures imposed under the SSM, adopting resolution 
decisions and carrying out the administration of resolution.159 The Board 
will comprise a Chair, Vice-Chair, and four other full-time members to be 
appointed by the Parliament based on a shortlist recommended by the 
Commission, and the representatives of the national resolution authorities 
of participating Member States.160 A representative of each of the ECB 
and the Commission may attend at the plenary161 and executive sessions of 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
155 Kern Alexander, ‘Bank Resolution and Recovery in the EU: Enhancing Banking 
Union?’ (2013) 14 ERA Forum 81; Daniel Gros and Dirk Schoenmaker, ‘European 
Deposit Insurance and Resolution in Banking Union’ (2014) 52 JCMS. 
156 Eilis Ferran, ‘European Banking Union: Imperfect but it can Work’ (2014) at 
http://ssrn.com/abstract=2426247. 
157 SRM Regulation. 
158 SRM Regulation, art 42. 
159 ibid, art 7. 
160 ibid, arts 43, 53. 
161 The plenary sessions are annual in nature and deal with important issues such as 
adoption of work programme and budget, SRM Regulation, arts 46-48. The 
executive sessions are relevant to the Chair, Vice-Chair and four full-time members 
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the Board as permanent observers.162 The Parliament’s role in appointment 
may constitute a form of input control of the constitution of the Board 
that countervails the relatively autonomous ECB in its SSM leadership.  
 
The SRM is structured in such a way as to offer opportunities for inter-
agency coordination and accountability with the SSM. The discussion 
below explores the junctures of possible inter-agency coordination and 
learning. However, at the moment, these are framed as divisions of 
responsibilities and it is unclear how inter-agency coordination may take 
place. This article suggests that the overt framing of inter-agency 
coordination can mitigate boundary issues and promote more technocratic 
effectiveness through inter-agency learning and coordination. More 
informal guidelines can be agreed upon between the SSM and SRM in due 
course to foster inter-agency coordination and the ESFS should be also 
more overtly drawn into the inter-agency coordination and learning 
relationships.  
 
The interface between the SSM and SRM is as follows. The SRM is 
responsible for drawing up resolution plans in dialogue with the ECB and 
national regulators,163 and determining whether a bank faces impediments 
to its resolvability. 164  The SSM is responsible for implementing the 
resolution plans adopted by the SRB or removing impediments to 
resolvability according to the SRB’s instructions.  As the SSM becomes an 
implementer of the SRM’s decisions on resolution plans, this provides a 
check on the SSM’s micro-prudential supervisory role and feedback from 
the SRM could provide learning opportunities for the SSM. However, 
depending on the power dynamics between the SSM and the SRM, it 
remains to be seen if the SRM is able to take technocratic leadership on its 
tasks and not be overwhelmed by ECB expertise, and whether the SSM 
and SRM would engage in such feedback and dialogue. Furthermore, the 
SRM is tasked to monitor early intervention measures taken by the SSM, 
which need to be informed to the SRM. The SSM has leadership in 
managing the run-up to any bank crisis in the form of early intervention, 
but the SRM and Commission would monitor the early intervention 
measures to ensure that there would be a seamless transition to resolution 
if that becomes necessary.165 It remains open to observation how such 
coordination would work out. 166  The dividing line between early 
intervention and crisis resolution is a shifting one and there is ample 
opportunity for the SSM and SRM to coordinate on this and share 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
only and deal with the executive management of the Board’s tasks including 
preparatory work for the plenary sessions, SRM Regulation, arts 51-52. 
162 ibid, art 43. 
163 ibid, art 8. 
164 ibid, art 10. 
165 ibid, art 13. 
166  Remarks by Rosa Lastra on Charles Goodhart and M Sevagiano, ‘The 
Determination of Bank Recovery’ at the ‘Law and Monetary Policy’ Conference, 
University of Sheffield, 10 September 2014. 
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information. These interfaces provide opportunities for inter-agency 
coordination and learning and this article suggests that such opportunities 
can be framed into more overt inter-agency frameworks instead of being 
regarded as boundaries of responsibility division. Such overt frameworks 
may go some way towards mitigating institutional imbalance between the 
ECB in the SSM and the SRM, and could allow inter-agency learning and 
coordination to strengthen each agency’s technocratic expertise and 
effectiveness.  
 
However, could it be argued that the SRM is nevertheless weak as an 
institution as it is tightly subject to political control and accountability, 
and so does not provide institutional balance to the powerful ECB in the 
SSM? There is a danger that the ECB could still dominate the SRM’s role 
as the ECB plays the part of determining (upon consultation with the 
Board) if an entity is failing or likely to fail and in need of resolution.167 
However, the SRM still determines if a resolution decision should be 
proposed according to the objectives and principles governing 
resolution.168 Furthermore, the SRM needs to submit a resolution decision 
to be adopted jointly by the Commission169 within 24 hours of notification 
by the SRM, and by the Council170 within 12 hours of notification by the 
Commission. The decision-making mechanism for the crucial resolution 
decision involves extensive political control. This is possibly warranted as 
resolutions of national banks are matters of key national interest in many 
bank-based economies in the EU. The political control over the SRM 
could provide an indirect political check on the ECB’s dominance in 
financial stability oversight in general. In that vein, the SRB’s power to 
determine that the Single Resolution Fund needs to be called upon to 
financially assist any ailing bank is checked by the Commission which has 
powers to assess the appropriateness of State aid.171  The political control 
and accountability structures for the SRM could even act as countervailing 
forces against ECB dominance at the juncture of the inter-relationships 
between the SSM and SRM. Hence, the author supports more overt 
framing of the SRM-SSM inter-agency coordination to mitigate 
institutional imbalance introduced by the SSM.  
 
The SRM also interacts with the ESFS in terms of its coordination with 
the EBA. The SRM has the power to notify the EBA of any institutions it 
views as unresolvable,172  and so the EBA is brought into the dialogue. 
Furthermore, the EBA remains responsible for drafting the technical 
standards, implementing technical standards and guidelines for the 
Recovery and Resolution Directive that applies to all SSM and non-SSM 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
167 SRM Regulation, art 18(1)(a). 
168 ibid, arts 14, 15. 
169 ibid, art 18. 
170 ibid. 
171 ibid, art 19. 
172 ibid, art 10. 
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Member States. Thus, there is potential for inter-agency coordination and 
accountability between the SRM and the EBA. This article suggests more 
overt framing of inter-agency coordination between the SRM, SSM and 
the EBA so that a multiple-agency architecture can arise for specific areas 
of coordination. This not only helps to check ECB dominance in the SSM, 
but would also help consolidate the SRM’s and EBA’s burgeoning 
identities and technocratic leadership.  
 
That said, the author is mindful that the dynamics of the new inter-
relationships remain uncertain. A differentiation may occur between the 
SRM-SSM which are responsible for the euro-area financial institutions 
and the ESFS which may focus on the non-euro area if marginalised by the 
SSM-SRM domination in the case of euro-area financial institutions. Such 
differentiation would arguably be lamentable as certain advantages may be 
foregone - the benefits of joined-up thinking in EU financial regulation 
and the mutual strengthening of the relatively new institutions in the 
financial regulation architecture. The author is concerned about the 
prospect of agency-led differentiation in EU financial regulation for the 
euro area and non-euro area, and argues that the suggestions made above 
regarding how inter-agency coordination may work between the ESFS, 
SSM and SRM could go some way towards mitigating the prospect of such 
differentiation. 
 
In sum, the second stage of institutional reform in the financial regulatory 
architecture in the EU has brought about more complexity in the multiple-
agency structure. Such complexity, as discussed in the context of the ESFS, 
could work towards boosting agency independence, effectiveness and 
inter-agency accountability. However, the ESFS has an overall coherent 
structure, identical mandates and comprises of entities at similar stages of 
development and maturity. The new complexity brought about by the SSM 
and SRM may introduce confusion in power dynamics in terms of 
institutional imbalance and lack of clarity in the boundaries of 
responsibilities. Furthermore, synergies in joined-up thinking in EU 
financial regulation may be lost if institutional dynamics veer towards a 
differentiation between SSM-SRM led oversight for euro-area financial 
institutions and the ESFS for the rest. This article suggests that insights 
from inter-agency coordination may provide a roadmap towards promoting 
better institutional balance, inter-agency learning and the consolidation of 
burgeoning agencies’ responsibilities, identities and competence. Such 
roadmap would also mitigate against the trajectory towards differentiated 
integration between financial regulation in the euro and non-euro areas. 
Inter-agency learning and coordination could also in due course enhance 
inter-agency accountability and the overall accountability and legitimacy of 
the EU financial regulatory architecture. 
 
V. FINAL OBSERVATIONS AND CONCLUSIONS 
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This article first addresses the multiple-agency regulatory architecture in 
the ESFS which comprises of an oft-criticised sectoral approach. It argues 
that in the context of the EU, the three agencies and the Joint Committee 
and ESRB could provide a viable and sound approach to EU financial 
regulation as inter-agency learning and coordination, as well as 
accountability could help enhance each of the ESFS institutions’ growth, 
maturity and development in technocratic leadership, and could be 
perceived to be more legitimate and effective than a centralised and 
monolithic entity. The concepts of inter-agency coordination and 
accountability are explored and observations are provided on how they 
work in the Joint Committee and Board of Appeal. The experiences of the 
Joint Committee and Board of Appeal provide useful lessons for inter-
agency learning and accountability and further empirical research on these 
concepts could be useful for developing a concept of legitimacy for EU 
agencies. 
 
The article then examines potential ramifications for the inter-agency 
architecture in EU financial regulation with the introduction of the SSM 
and SRM. The inter-agency framework has become more complex and 
there are concerns regarding the SSM becoming differentiated and 
monolithic, undermining the rest of the ESFS especially the EBA and 
ESRB. This is largely due to the dominance of an already powerful and 
autonomous ECB in the SSM, and the ECB would hardly need to 
consolidate its identity and leadership through greater inter-agency 
coordination and accountability with the rest of the ESFS. Would the 
SSM and EBA be able to coordinate in terms of supervisory convergence in 
micro-prudential supervision? Would the SRM and SSM be able to work 
with each other in the shift from early intervention to crisis resolution; and 
with the EBA in a single rulebook for recovery and resolution? The SSM is 
placed in a position where opportunities to coordinate with the SRM and 
EBA occur, but such interfaces are not framed as opportunities for inter-
agency learning and coordination but as divisions of responsibility at 
present. This article advocates more overt framing of inter-agency 
coordination and learning between the SSM, SRM and EBA in order to 
achieve better institutional balance and secure greater consolidation of the 
burgeoning institutions’ technocratic leadership and identities. The 
promotion of inter-agency accountability could greatly enhance the new 
and more complex financial regulatory architecture, and perhaps prevent 
inefficient forms of differentiated financial regulation from occurring 
between the euro area and non-euro area. Furthermore, in light of the 
comparatively more powerful ECB in the matrix, the Parliament review’s 
call to boost the three agencies’ Chairpersons’ peer status vis-a-vis the 
Commission may be useful.173  
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A multiple-agency approach at the EU may seem complex and 
anachronistic, but this article has pointed out the potential for making 
inter-agency coordination and accountability work. These observations 
may help in the outworking of the SSM and SRM and in the wider context 
of EU agencies, their effectiveness and legitimacy. 
